Kateryna Khalabuzar. Center for European Integration Studies, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms Universität Bonn, 2023.

With the war in Ukraine the European security architecture is experiencing turbulence caused by threats to governance, peace and stability, energy and food security. This upheaval in the spectrum of the actual threats served as a momentum for a radical shift in the EU's perception of its neighborhood, particularly of Ukraine.

Sven Biscop. Egmont Policy Brief, 2023.

n June 2022, the European Union granted candidate status to Ukraine. A strong political statement, which
was welcomed as such in Kyiv. But for a country at war, symbols do not suffice.

Akhvlediani T. and Movchan V., CEPS, 2024.

The groundwork for Ukraine’s integration into the EU’s single market was laid by the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA). A key component of the AA, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), paved the way for Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU’s single market. Building on the DCFTA, Ukraine’s integration into the EU’s economy has significantly advanced since February 2022. In response to the invasion, the EU swiftly and temporarily but completely liberalised its market for Ukrainian goods through Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs) and triggered the Temporary Protection Directive that has enabled over 4 million Ukrainian refugees to reside and work in the EU.

Anne Pintsch and Maryna Rabinovych. Fondation Robert Schuman, 2023.
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L'Union européenne a répondu à l'invasion par des sanctions sans précédent à l’encontre de la Russie
et de la Biélorussie, et par un soutien résolu et multiforme à l'Ukraine. Elle a notamment brisé de nombreux tabous en utilisant, pour la première fois, la Facilité européenne pour la paix dans le but de fournir des armes à un pays tiers en guerre ou en offrant une protection collective à quelque huit millions de citoyens ukrainiens fuyant la guerre.

The Institute of National Security Studies, 2023.

Although the war is far from over, at this stage it is already possible to see how the use of open-source intelligence (OSINT), based
on commercial capabilities, knowledge-sharing communities on social media, and artificial intelligence tools developed in the private sector
have improved the ability of the Ukrainian military to gather intelligence to offset the relative advantage of the Russian military.

Ben Cahill and Leslie Palti-Guzman. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023..

This brief examines the role of natural gas in Ukraine’s energy future. It summarizes Ukraine’s gas resources and the role of gas in the economy, analyzes how natural gas investment fits with other reconstruction priorities, and examines the role of Ukraine’s gas resources in a lower-carbon Europe.

Colin Wall and Njord Wegge.Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2023. .

The impact of Russia’s war in Ukraine has been felt in the Arctic. The region’s primary diplomatic venue is paused, and military
tensions are increasing. When Sweden and Finland join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), every Arctic country save
Russia will be a member of the U.S.-led alliance. The war has not diminished Russia’s core economic and security interests in the
region, but it has had some impact on its military readiness there in the short term, especially in terms of ground capabilities,
if not at sea or in the air.

Giovanni Grevi.Foundation for European Progressive Studies, 2023.

The war in Ukraine carries extensive implications that intersect with multiple longterm trends and variables shaping international affairs. What lies ahead is terra incognita – a strategic landscape that eludes ready historical analogies. Strategic foresight is essential to be able to explore this territory, make sense of potential developments, and guide action.