European Commission: Joint Research Centre, Bongiardo, D., Chiaramello, D., Dara, A., Cortinovis, R. et al., Atlas of migration 2024, Bongiardo, D.(editor), Dara, A.(editor), Crespi, I.(editor) and Sofos, I.(editor), Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

The Atlas of Migration is more than just a publication—it is a testament to the power of data and rigorous analysis in illuminating the multifaceted nature of migratory movements. The 2024 edition of the Atlas continues to serve as a vital tool for policymakers, researchers and the public at large, offering a wealth of data to cut through the confusion and misinformation that often surrounds the discourse on migration. The Atlas provides the latest harmonised and validated data on migration for the 27 EU Member States and for 171 countries and territories around the world. It brings together data from many reliable sources, such as Eurostat, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, the World Bank and many others. This year’s thematic chapter of the Atlas delves into the nuanced motivations behind migration, moving beyond simplified narratives in favour of a more comprehensive view that acknowledges the diverse and often overlapping reasons that propel individuals to move.

European Commission: European Innovation Council and SMEs Executive Agency, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

China’s convention and exhibition industry has shown a steady growth over the years. From only six international events held in 1978, the number of conventions and exhibitions in China surpassed 10,000 already in 2017, with a total rentable exhibiting area largely exceeding 10 million square meters. A number of major Chinese trade fairs have gained global recognition and attract every year thousands of overseas exhibitors and visitors.

European University Institute, Sáenz Leandro, R. and Saura García, C., European University Institute, 2024.

This policy brief explores the extensive deployment of Chinese AI and machine learning technologies across Europe and Latin America in social surveillance. Over the past decade, these technologies have become deeply integrated into the security frameworks of numerous nations, enhancing capabilities in image classification, facial recognition, video analysis, and voice identification. As one of the world's leading providers, China's big tech companies equip governments with sophisticated tools that facilitate unprecedented monitoring and data collection.

European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, Ghiretti, F., Gunter, J., et al., European Parliament, 2023.

This study looks at Chinese investments in maritime infrastructures through the lens of ‘de-risking’ for the first time. It provides a comprehensive overview of Chinese investments in the European maritime sector over the past two decades and weighs the associated risks. The study borrows the framework adopted by the National Risk Assessment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2022 for its risk assessment and further develops it to score the impact and likelihood of the investments across five major threat areas: EU-level dependency risk, individual dependency risk, coercion/influence risk, cyber/data risk and hard security risk. The analysis illustrates that the risks remain insufficiently understood by Member States, despite their high likelihood and/or impact. This is particularly true for economic coercion and cyber/data security risks.

European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, Ghiretti, F., Gunter, J., et al., European Parliament, 2023.

This study looks at Chinese investments in non-maritime transport infrastructure in the EU and EU Neighbourhood through the lens of ‘de-risking’ for the first time. It provides a comprehensive overview of Chinese investments in the European non-maritime transport infrastructure over the past two decades and weighs the associated risks. The study borrows the framework adopted by the National Risk Assessment of the Kingdom of the Netherlands 2022 for its risk assessment and further develops it to score the impact and likelihood of the investments across five major threat areas: EU-level dependency risk, individual dependency risk, coercion/influence risk, cybersecurity/data risk and hard security risk. The analysis illustrates that the risks remain insufficiently understood by Member States, despite their high likelihood and/or impact. This is particularly true for economic coercion and cybersecurity/data risks.

In order to address the diversity of country and territory codes and names used in the EU institutions, the European Commission has developed a corporate code list of countries and territories that covers the different use cases its services have.

Auzanne Frederike Kolvoort, European University Institute, 2024.

With the rise of grand development strategies and the increasingly urgent need to attract private investment for development objectives, the position of development finance institutions (DFIs) has become more articulated. DFIs take up a key intermediary position between governors and private actors in the governance of development finance. Drawing on competence-control theory, this thesis examines how the competence of DFIs is influenced by the level of state control. By providing a comparative analysis of the financing of China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the EU’s Global Gateway, the study finds general support for the hypothesis that reduced state control enhances DFI competence.

European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Brinza, A., Bērziņa-Čerenkova, U., et al., European Parliament, 2024.

To evaluate the European Union’s (EU) policy framework towards China, this study analyses the varied facets of bilateral relations and the EU’s approach towards China, including its policy of de-risking, together with issues relating to China’s domestic politics and foreign policy. It highlights the need for the EU to adopt a coherent vision and a comprehensive and consistent long-term China strategy that can guide its future actions towards China and on the world stage. Based on its findings, it also provides a series of specific recommendations for the EU on the numerous topics analysed in the study.

European Commission, European Research Executive Agency, Publications Office of the European Union, 2023.

This Handbook is intended to act as a reference for those agri-food producers planning for, or in the process of entering, the Chinese market. This Handbook provides step-by-step guides on entering the agri-food market in China including relevant information such as analysis of the Chinese market for different product categories, market access and market entry procedures, IP protection, referrals to professional buyers and a signposting and referral system providing useful contacts and ways to penetrate the Chinese market.

European Union Institute for Security Studies and Trakimavičius, L., Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

The EU has ambitious goals for accelerating the energy transition through locally manufactured technologies. However, Beijing’s grip on the clean tech industry makes it difficult for the EU to go green without Chinese equipment or its extensive supply chains. China’s advantage lies in government incentives, access to critical materials, highly efficient manufacturing ecosystems, lower labour costs and less stringent environmental regulations. To advance its energy goals, the EU should pursue a multipronged strategy. It needs to ensure a level playing field for its clean tech companies and prioritise innovative technologies that rely less on imported materials and Chinese supply chains. It also has to secure access to critical materials through trade deals and consider establishing stockpiles of these.

European University Institute and Creemers, R., European University Institute, 2024.

New technologies play a critical role in nearly all European concerns vis-à-vis China. Some of these involve security and privacy. Huawei’s 5G infrastructure, Chinese-made drones and smart cars are, for instance, often portrayed as vectors for Chinese espionage and surveillance. The new Commissioner for Jobs and Social Rights, Nicolas Schmit, states that his attitude to TikTok is “quite American,” hinting at support for a possible ban. Others are economic in nature: China’s rapid advance in EV technology is in sharp competition with Europe’s automotive industry, which directly or indirectly employs more people than the population of Belgium.

European Commission: Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

The thematic scope of the study covers EU digital performance relative to the benchmark countries, with the analysis being framed according to the four cardinal points of the Digital Decade: (1) digital skills; (2) digital infrastructure; (3) the digital transformation of businesses; and (4) digital public services. In addition to the EU 27, the geographical scope of this study covers the seven non-EU benchmark countries, selected on the basis of their prowess in digitalisation and/or economic significance: Australia, China, Israel, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

European Union Institute for Security Studies, Ditrych, O. and Ekman, A., Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

China-Russia joint military exercises should be taken seriously, considering their frequency, complexity and global reach. Some are designed for communication and political messaging, signalling displeasure with the US military presence in various regions and defence cooperation among Western allies. Others are more complex and challenging, and feature intricate war games. It is likely that China and Russia will continue to conduct such exercises, jointly but also increasingly with third countries, as part as their reinforced defence cooperation and joint endeavour to build an anti-Western coalition. The EU should vigilantly monitor these exercises, and pay close attention to the locations, exact nature and objectives of the drills in order to improve strategic foresight capacities related to China and Russia’s activities in contested regions.

European Commission, Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Connell Garcia, W., Garrone, M., Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

This study considers some challenges in the automobile industry of the EU taking into account its relatively historical privileged international position. It starts with an evaluation of the potential consequences arising from a global shift in the current global demand of cars, particularly towards countries like China. Assuming a continuation in the current method of car production, which relies on both internal combustion engines (ICEs) and Electric Vehicles (EVs), the shift in global demand poses adverse economic risks for the EU. This is due to the restricted use of EU supply chains to meet the current final demand for cars in the Chinese market.

European Commission, Directorate-General for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, Vandermeeren, F., Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

The EU is operating an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. It has been confronting a sequence of shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian aggression against Ukraine. Geopolitical tensions are on the rise, with global actors – notably China and the US – deploying aggressive strategies to secure investments and technology leadership. Trade disruptions are increasingly likely and the risk of weaponization by third countries of the EU’s strategic dependencies results in economic security concerns. In this context, the EU aims to de-risk – not de-couple – from China.