European Commission: European Innovation Council and SMEs Executive Agency, European monitor of industrial ecosystems – International report on Japan with a deep-dive on biotechnology 2024, Publications Office of the European Union, 2025.

In terms of technology development, Japan is particularly strong in advanced materials and nanotechnology and in micro- and nanoelectronics and photonics, holding shares of transnational patent applications of at least 30% in these fields and therefore outperforming the EU in these domains. The country’s level of patent intensity (number of patents filed per billion dollars of GDP) is also higher than the EU’s for most of the technologies examined, most strikingly in advanced manufacturing technologies, artificial intelligence, and clean production technologies, in addition to the two abovementioned areas. At the same time, the country has seen a strong increase in its share of global patent applications in recycling technologies, but this has been accompanied by continuous declines in renewable energy technologies and biotechnology. In terms of investments, Japan consistently remained above the EU in terms of overall expenditure on R&D from both public and private sources, registering an increase from 3% to 3.4% between 2010 and 2020, whereas the EU recorded an increase from 2% to 2.3% within the same period. The main target of business R&D expenditure in the country is the automobile and parts sector. When it comes to venture capital and private equity investments, Japan’s overall investments have remained volatile over time; in 2022, they were lower than in the years prior, but they registered a spike in renewable energy and energy-saving technologies during that year, as well as a strong leap in microand nanoelectronics in 2023. For Japanese start-ups, public offerings are typical exit strategies. Regarding trade balance across different technological fields, Japan presents a high-value export basket composed namely of goods such as motors vehicles, electronics, and industrial machinery. The country has a trade surplus in all examined technologies, showing particular strength in the area of advanced manufacturing technologies and robotics (where it has a trade surplus of around 70%), except biotechnology and digital security.

European Parliament: Directorate-General for Citizens’ Rights, Justice and Institutional Affairs and Skundric, M., AFCO ad hoc Delegation to Japan – 13-18 April 2025, European Parliament, 2025.

The EU and Japan have a long-standing and multifaceted relationship, rooted in the shared values of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and open markets. Bi-lateral cooperation spans various sectors, including trade, technology, security, and global governance.

European Commission: Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, EU climate dialogues (EUCDs) – Support to the EU’s bilateral relations with strategic partners on climate-related policies and investments – Analysis and recommendations on cabotage regulations in Japan – Perspectives from offshore wind projects – Analytical report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

This Report is intended to: (a) provide detailed regulatory intelligence and an understanding of the regulatory environment in Japan, (b) facilitate dialogues among key business and policy stakeholders; (c) broaden each stakeholder's knowledge and understanding of the respective (floating) offshore wind relevant regulatory environments; and (d) improve public awareness about the opportunities and challenges of (floating) offshore wind with a special focus on climate neutrality and environmental sustainability.

European Union Institute for Security Studies and Koshino, Y., The changing submarine cables landscape – Expanding the EU’s role in the Indo-Pacific, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

Advances in digital technologies are driving a dramatic increase in the demand for global submarine cables. However, protection efforts in the Indo-Pacific remain inadequate amid growing risks from China. These risks affect the EU’s strategic and economic interests, as outlined in its 2021 Indo-Pacific strategy, thus requiring greater EU engagement. The EU and its Member States must assume a broader role in protecting submarine cables. Five areas for engagement include: enhancing public-private partnerships; collaborating with the Quad; developing legal and regulatory frameworks; investing in seabed monitoring technologies; and coordinating strategic infrastructure investments.

European University Institute and Baldauff, N., Why Japan’s defence technology cooperation with Europe deserves attention, European University Institute, 2024.

Due to self-imposed restrictions on joint defence equipment production and technology cooperation, Japan has long been an isolated player in the global defence industry. However, as it is facing the most severe and complex strategic environment in recent years and it has dwindling domestic defence industrial bases, Japan is fundamentally revamping its approach to defence production and technology cooperation. A key aspect of this transformation is a fundamental reinforcement of Japan’s defence capabilities, which is crucial to achieve its national security objectives.

European University Institute and Sakaki, A., Japan – A critical player in Southeast Asia, European University Institute, 2024.

Japan plays a critical yet often overlooked role in the geopolitical dynamics of Southeast Asia – an important region at the centre of the Indo-Pacific where US-China rivalry has intensified over the past decade. Having overcome antagonisms related to its pre-1945 wartime and colonial history in Southeast Asia, Japan has built comprehensive and deep relations with the region’s countries. While Tokyo has long treated Southeast Asia as a foreign policy priority, it has since around 2012 doubled down on its engagement efforts due to concern about China’s expanding influence in the region. This policy brief argues that Japan’s approach during this time has been characterised by four interconnected tenets, which point to the country’s central role in regional dynamics.

European Commission: Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology and Visionary Analytics, International benchmarking of the digital transformation – Final report, Publications Office of the European Union, 2024.

The thematic scope of the study covers EU digital performance relative to the benchmark countries, with the analysis being framed according to the four cardinal points of the Digital Decade: (1) digital skills; (2) digital infrastructure; (3) the digital transformation of businesses; and (4) digital public services. In addition to the EU 27, the geographical scope of this study covers the seven non-EU benchmark countries, selected on the basis of their prowess in digitalisation and/or economic significance: Australia, China, Israel, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. While no strict limits have been set regarding the temporal scope of the study, a broad enough time frame has been set to account for the most significant or relevant policy initiatives or strategies related to the areas under study. For example, in the qualitative analysis, we look mostly at active policy actions. With regard to the quantitative dimension, the study’s temporal scope is determined by the availability of and limitations to data, but in general, no data older than five years is included. Regarding the timeline of data collection, the study ran from November 2023 to February 2024, with most data collection activities being implemented during December 2023 and January 2024.

European University Institute and Pejsova, E., Going ‘strategic’ – The EU-Japan SPA five years on, European University Institute, 2024.

The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) signed in 2018 is often portrayed as a milestone in the bilateral relationship. Five years after its conclusion, it is time to look at the progress in pushing forward this partnership to a next, more strategically significant, level. This policy brief focuses on the ‘Peace and Security’ priority cluster in the SPA, tracing the drivers behind the current EU-Japan political-security rapprochement and the key accomplishments achieved under the SPA framework. While structural developments largely explain the dawn of a ‘golden era’ in EU-Japan relations, this paper argues that the current positive momentum has also been enabled by the changing nature of security threats and the increasingly blurred dividing line between traditional and non-traditional security challenges.

European University Institute and Gaens, B., Japan’s normative policy – Coalition-building and pragmatism, European University Institute, 2024.

Since the start of Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine in February 2022, awareness has grown in the West that the so-called rules-based order and ‘universal values’ are not shared globally. Many countries in the global South have refused to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, let alone comply with Western sanctions against Moscow, while rejecting the predominantly American logic of dividing the world into “democracies versus autocracies,” as proposed by US President Joe Biden. Others such as China and Russia aim to propose entirely different sets of values. In short, the war in Ukraine has reignited the debate on universal values, and ideational power plays a central role in the ongoing great-power competition. On the positive side, the Ukraine war united the European Union in taking a strong and common stance on condemning the breach of sovereignty and stressing the necessity for international law to prevail. However, the conflict in the Middle East between Israel and Hamas has further exacerbated the values debate. Countries in the Global South are accusing the EU of maintaining double standards, failing to speak out against Israel’s infringement of international law and forsaking the emphasis on strongly held European values such as human dignity and human rights. The Middle East conflict has furthermore lain bare divisions within the EU, between the Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS), and between individual Member States.

European Commission: Joint Research Centre, Bongiardo, D., Chiaramello, D., Dara, A., Cortinovis, R. et al., ‘Eastern Asia’ in Atlas of migration 2024 , Bongiardo, D., Dara, A., Crespi, I. and Sofos, I.(eds), Publications Office of the European Union, 2024, pp. 258–271.

The Atlas of Migration is more than just a publication—it is a testament to the power of data and rigorous analysis in illuminating the multifaceted nature of migratory movements. The 2024 edition of the Atlas continues to serve as a vital tool for policymakers, researchers and the public at large, offering a wealth of data to cut through the confusion and misinformation that often surrounds the discourse on migration. The Atlas provides the latest harmonised and validated data on migration for the 27 EU Member States and for 171 countries and territories around the world. It brings together data from many reliable sources, such as Eurostat, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, the World Bank and many others. This year’s thematic chapter of the Atlas delves into the nuanced motivations behind migration, moving beyond simplified narratives in favour of a more comprehensive view that acknowledges the diverse and often overlapping reasons that propel individuals to move.

European Parliament: Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Pacheco Pardo, R. and Pejšová, E., Deepening EU-Japan cooperation – In-depth analysis, European Parliament, 2023.

The EU–Japan partnership has undergone a substantial transformation over the past two decades. Historically limited to trade and economic cooperation, the decision to step up political-security cooperation, recorded since the mid-2010s, is a result of both partners’ shifting foreign policy outlooks against an increasingly volatile global strategic environment that is defined by a return of great power politics. The conclusion of the EU–Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) in 2018 marks a symbolic upgrade in the relationship, reflecting a growing strategic alignment and willingness to address common global security challenges. Bilateral cooperation has so far increased, especially in the fields of economic security, maritime security, cybersecurity, sustainable connectivity, energy transition, digital transformation, as well as greater coordination within relevant multilateral international frameworks. However, the prospects for further cooperation are vast and many of the political agreements still need to be translated into action. This In-Depth Analysis traces the progress in EU–Japan cooperation achieved so far, highlighting the most promising areas for future collaboration based on both parties shared strategic interests, respective capacities, and political objectives.

European University Institute and Vyas, U., Zeitenwende – The view from Japan, European University Institute, 2023.

Japan has been cultivating good relations with Europe, including the European Union and non-member states, for decades. Although its primary focus has been on the US in the post-war period for security, and on East Asia for trade and investment in the post-Cold War era, both economic and latterly security relations with Europe have developed steadily and towards greater cooperation. Since the 1970s, Japanese companies have been increasing their investments, networks and local relations in various parts of Europe, in car manufacturing, financial services and industrial chemicals, among many other industries. With the gradual revision of Japan’s stance on international security cooperation under successive administrations from officially being against collective security towards allowing for defence exports and other security cooperation, it has also been attracting interest from European governments, EU agencies and commercial defence organisations regarding exchanges and joint programmes.

European University Institute and Midford, P., The Senkaku islands and the pivot in Japanese defence policy, European University Institute, 2023.

Japanese defence policy made global headlines in December 2022 when Japan announced new versions of all three of its main security documents for the first time in nine years: the National Security Strategy (NSS), Japan`s capstone defence document, the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which had previously been known as the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG), and the Defense Buildup Program (DBP), previously known as the Mid-Term Defense Program. What grabbed global headlines was not merely the announcement of new versions of these three fundamental defence documents but the big changes in Japanese defence that they heralded.

In order to address the diversity of country and territory codes and names used in the EU institutions, the European Commission has developed a corporate code list of countries and territories that covers the different use cases its services have.