Center for the Study of Democracy, 2023.

Southeast Europe (SEE) remains one of the most vulnerable soft targets for the Kremlin’s ongoing hybrid war against the European Union and the democratic West. The combination of state and media capture, simmering ethnic divisions both between and within countries, and the legacy of Russian cognitive bias all make the region vulnerable to Kremlin’s aggression following their invasion of Ukraine. Illicit finance and disinformation are two of the most potent sharp power tools that the Kremlin has deployed to undermine democratic processes in Southeast Europe. The usage of these tools has also provided fertile ground for the corrosive influence of China and other authoritarian powers.

Kleemann, A., Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 2023.

Täuschung und Medienmanipulation sind seit jeher fester Bestandteil der Kriegs kommunikation. Nie zuvor aber war es derart einfach, qualitativ hochwertige Fäl schungen von Ton-, Bild- und Videoaufzeichnungen zu erstellen. Die menschliche Neigung, emotional auf diese Medien zu reagieren, eröffnet deren Produzenten eine völlig neue Dimension des Missbrauchs. Mit einem Kapitulationsaufruf von Präsident Selenskyj, der umgehend als Deepfake entlarvt wurde, liegt der erste Versuch eines Einsatzes der neuen Technologie in einem bewaffneten Konflikt vor. Derartige Fäl schungen werden immer besser, die Erkennung immer aufwendiger und ein Ende dieser Entwicklung ist nicht absehbar. Ein Verbot von Deepfakes ist aussichtslos. Es ist deshalb Zeit, sich mit den aktuellen und potentiellen Anwendungsfällen und mit möglichen Gegenstrategien auseinanderzusetzen.

Hiebert, K., Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2022.

Deepfakes are a boon for autocracies using technology leading to social control. Democracies rely on freedom of expression, alternative viewpoints, uncomfortable truths and the open exchange of ideas. The rapid evolution of disinformation in recent years has revealed democracy’s foundation to be a simultaneous vulnerability, notes the author.

Neidhardt, A.-H. and Butcher, P., Migration Policy Institute, 2022.

Disinformation about refugees, other migrants, and minority groups adapts to the shifting news cycle—while also appealing to people’s pre-existing convictions and tapping into current worries, in this case about generalized violence and household incomes struggling to keep up with rising prices. Salient events such as the war in Ukraine act as catalysts, enabling coordinated disinformation-producing activist groups and extremists to grab people’s attention and stoke fears, in some cases even setting the tone of the political discourse surrounding the management of migratory phenomena and the policies governing them. Why does migration, broadly understood, attract so much disinformation? What are the most common themes found in disinformation sources and in online content spreading hostility towards migrants, refugees, and minority groups? What strategies have governments and civil-society organizations taken to oppose migration-related disinformation and misinformation? Focusing on the European context, this article answers these questions by drawing on research carried out by the European Policy Centre (EPC) with the Foundation for European Progressive Studies and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in 2020 and 2021.

Robin, M., Fondation Robert Schuman, 2023.

As a target population, an object of propaganda and a receptacle of discourse, the European Union (EU) is directly concerned by the propaganda narratives developed by certain state and non-state actors. Propaganda may or may not include falsified elements and fake news (disinformation). It aims to influence and manipulate an opinion to achieve strategic effects in the interest of the propagandist. The European Union, together with the Member States, strives to develop strategies to combat propagandist content and its effects.

Szicherle, P., GLOBSEC Policy Institute, 2023.

In this policy report, GLOBSEC takes a look at the main challenges democracies face regarding foreign malign influence and best practices in countering these activities. Based on our research, the following measures are recommended if democratic societies wish to improve their resilience against hybrid threats: long-term strategic thinking is crucial; addressing polarization and building trust in public institutions are essential to combatting foreign malign influence; more coordination is required between stakeholders seeking to develop resilience; the EU needs a “Buy Democratic Act”; Elevate corruption to a national security issue; more must be spent on fighting; the independence of public broadcasters is crucial; European media literacy guidelines are needed in all local languages; Social media companies must be forced to act; Remain proportional.

Sleibi, A., Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission, 2023.

The two shores of the Mediterranean, like the broader world, have been brought closer with the advent of thousands of channels of international information exchange. Despite this digital proximity, the current media landscape has grown rather saturated, allowing for the proliferation of disinformation and general inaccuracy in the context of politicised issues. In referring to disinformation, this brief adheres to definitions used by the EU, and refers to disinformation as a combination of false, inaccurate, or misleading information that is propagated with the intention of causing public harm or realising some form of economic or political profit. Crucially, this brief points out how the challenges of disinformation in this conflict context have yet to be balanced along the market logic of supply and demand. Overall, the current state of EU disinformation countermeasures indicates a distinct focus on the supply side of disinformation, and a limited reach resulting from the geographical, linguistic and technical limitations inherent to current policies.

Ferenčík, J., EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, 2023.

Global politics, as it exists today, is inseparable from disinformation. This has always been the case. Disinformation has been a concern for centuries, even prior to the invention of the Printing Press in Gutenberg in the 1450s. The present threat is more dire than in these previous cases, however, because of the algorithms of social media. Social media picks up on unique human frailties, like our obsession with negativity and our proclivity for (often justified) outrage over the content we frequently find on these sites, and propels this content to the most viewers. Increasingly, observers are realizing that this, too, has the potential to undermine democracies. So, what are some steps that could help East Central and Eastern European countries protect their democracies from foreign disinformation?